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Non-technical Summary 
Patent-based measures are the most frequently used indicators in empirical research on 
innovation and technological change. In particular, patent forward citations have become an 
established measure for the technological and economic value of patents in the empirical 
innovation literature. Forward patent citations are found to correlate positively and 
significantly with patents’ economic value reported in surveys as well as with firms’ market 
value. Recent studies criticize, however, that forward citations explain only very little of the 
actual variance in patent value. A possible reason may be that citations to prior art are made 
for different purposes. While some references to patents are made to define the non-infringing 
state of the art in a technology field, others refer to infringing documents that could hinder the 
patent grant decision. The aim of this study is to exploit heterogeneity in patent citation types 
by examining whether certain types of forward citations correlate more strongly with patent 
value than others. We suggest and show that blocking patent citations are more highly 
correlated with the economic value of cited patents than other types of citations. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of the top R&D spending U.S., European and 
Japanese firms in three R&D intensive industries. We focus on their triadic patents, i.e. 
patents that are jointly filed at the U.S., European and Japanese patent offices. Triadic patents 
reflect a selected group of inventions of which the owner expects most profits as she is willing 
to incur the relatively high patent filing and patent maintenance costs at all three patent 
offices. Our patent data is consolidated annually, taking into account annual changes in 
corporate group structures. Using panel data methods to control for unobserved firm-specific 
fixed effects we find that an increase of the percentage of blocking citations of one standard 
deviation yields a higher market value of about 10 percent. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Patentbasierte Maße sind die meistgenutzten Indikatoren in der empirischen 
Forschung zu Innovation und technologischem Wandel. Insbesondere solche 
Zitationen, die Patente von anderen Patentanmeldungen erhalten, sind ein etabliertes 
Maß für den ökonomischen Wert von Patenten geworden. Die Häufigkeit, mit der ein 
Patent zitiert wird, korreliert nicht nur mit dem Wert desPatents sondern auch mit dem 
Marktwert einer Firma, der ein solches Patent gehört. Aktuelle Studien kritisieren 
jedoch, dass Patentzitationen wenig von der Varianz des Patentwertes erklären. Eine 
mögliche Ursache dafür ist, dass Patente aus verschiedenen Gründen zitiert werden. 
Während manche Referenzen den Stand der Technik definieren ohne dabei die 
Innovativität der zitierenden Patentanmeldung zu gefährden, werden andere Patente 
zitiert, weil sie die Innovativität der zitierenden Patentanmeldung in Frage stellen. 
Diese Studie untersucht, ob die Heterogenität der Zitationsmotive sich in einem 
unterschiedlichen ökonomischen Wert widerspiegelt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Zitationen, die die Innovativität von Patentanmeldungen in Frage stellen, einen 
höheren ökonomischen Wert haben, als andere Zitationen. 
Die empirische Analyse basiert auf einer Stichprobe der innovativsten Unternehmen 
in den USA, Europa und Japan in drei verschiedenen Branchen. Wir analysieren die 
triadischen Patente dieser Firmen, d.h. Patente, die diese Firmen an den Patentämtern 
der USA, Europa und Japan angemeldet haben. Triadische Patente repräsentieren die 
Inventionen einer Firma, die die höchsten Profite versprechen. Unsere Patentdaten 
sind jährlich konsolidiert und damit für Änderungen in der Unternehmensstruktur 
über die Zeit bereinigt. Anhand von Paneldatenmethoden, die unbeobachtete, 
unternehmensspezifische Effekte kontrollieren, zeigt diese Studie, dass ein Anstieg 
 
 
der blockierenden Zitationen um eine Standardabweichung mit einem 10 Prozent 
höheren Marktwert der Firma einhergeht. 
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Abstract 
There is a growing literature that aims at assessing the private value of knowledge 
assets and patents. It has been shown that patents and their quality as measured by 
citations received by future patents contribute significantly to the market value of 
firms beyond their R&D stocks. This paper goes one step further and distinguishes 
between different types of forward citations patents can receive at the European 
Patent Office. While a patent can be cited as non-infringing state of the art, it can also 
be cited because it threatens the novelty of patent applications (“blocking citations”). 
Empirical results from a market value model for a sample of large, R&D-intensive 
U.S., European and Japanese firms show that patents frequently cited as blocking 
references have a higher economic value for their owners than patents cited for non-
blocking reasons. This finding adds to the patent value literature by showing that 
different types of patent citations carry different information on the economic value of 
patents. The result further suggests that the total number of forward citations can be 
an imprecise measure of patent value.  
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1 Introduction 
Patent-based measures are the most frequently used indicators in empirical 
research on innovation and technological change. The first studies employing patent 
data used patent counts as indicators of innovation output (Scherer, 1965; 
Schmookler, 1966; Griliches, 1984). Patented inventions differ however widely in 
their technological and economic ‘value’ or ‘importance’ (Schankerman and Pakes, 
1986; Albert et al., 1991; Harhoff et al., 1999). In response, patent forward citations 
have been put forward as a measure for the technological and economic value of 
patents (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et al., 2005). While forward patent citations are found 
to correlate positively and significantly with patents’ economic value reported in 
surveys (Harhoff et al., 1999; Gambardella et al., 2008) as well as with firms’ market 
value (Hall et al., 2005), forward citations appear to explain only very little of the 
actual variance in patent value. Studies by Gambardella et al. (2008) and Bessen 
(2008) show that forward citations explain no more than five percent of the actual 
variation in the value of European and US patents.  
A possible reason why forward citations explain little of the variance in patent 
value may be that citations to prior art are made for different reasons. The aim of this 
study is to exploit heterogeneity in patent citation types by examining whether certain 
types of citations correlate more strongly with patent value than others. If there is 
evidence for value differences with regard to different citation types, patent citation-
based value indicators could be improved by taking into account different citation 
types. Information on citation types is available for patents that are examined at the 
European Patent Office (EPO). At the EPO, patent examiners classify patent citations 
in different categories according to their relevance for the patent application in 
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question (Harhoff et al., 2005; Webb et al., 2005; Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008). 
Patent references that challenge the novelty or inventive step of the patent under 
examination (“blocking citations”) can be distinguished from references that define 
the state of the art in a technology field but are not prejudicing novelty or the 
inventive step.2  
We suggest that blocking patent citations are more highly correlated with the 
economic value of cited patents than other types of citations. Blocking citations 
indicate that the cited patent threatens the granting of other patent applications 
(Michel and Bettels, 2001; Harhoff et al., 2005) , which may provide the owner of the 
cited patent with an important competitive advantage as the cited patent may keep 
competitors off markets or technologies that are important to the owner of the cited 
patent by legally depriving competitors from obtaining own patents on related 
inventions (Guellec et al., 2008).  
We test the assertion that blocking citations correlate more highly with the 
economic value of patents than other citations by adding a measure for “blocking 
citations” to the market value equation that is used by Hall et al. (2005), and checking 
whether this variable allows for a better assessment of the value of patents. Besides 
examining the impact of “blocking” patent citations on the market value of firms, this 
paper has several other new features compared to existing market value studies. First, 
while most market value studies focus on U.S. or U.K. firms, in combination with 
national patent data (see the survey by Czarnitzki et al., 2006), we use a sample of 
multinational firms, i.e. the top R&D spending U.S., European and Japanese firms in 
three R&D intensive industries, and benchmark the value of triadic patents, i.e. 
                                                 
2 Another type of patent citation heterogeneity stems from the source of citations, i.e. examiner versus 
applicant given citations (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006; Hedge and Sampat, 2009).  
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patents that are jointly filed at the U.S., European and Japanese patent offices. Triadic 
patents reflect a selected group of inventions of which the owner expects most profits 
as she is willing to incur the relatively high patent filing and patent maintenance costs 
at all three patent offices (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2008). 
Second, we use panel data methods to control for unobserved firm-specific fixed 
effects which is not common in this strand of literature.3 Third, our data set features a 
characteristic that has not been considered in prior market value studies. Large firms 
are often involved in M&As over time. However, scholars so far only consolidated 
data on patents at a single point in time of the period under review without tracing the 
annual changes due to M&As or spin-outs. Our patent data is consolidated annually, 
taking into account annual changes in corporate group structures.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains 
an overview of the literature on the valuation of firms’ knowledge assets and patents. 
Section 3 describes the market value methodology. Section 4 presents the data set, 
explains variables definitions and contains descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the 
empirical results, and the last section concludes and discusses the implications of our 
findings. 
2 Literature Overview 
A broad set of studies has examined the value of firms’ knowledge assets and 
patents, employing different methodologies. One strand of the literature focuses on 
the estimation of production functions to study the returns to R&D at the firm and 
sector level (for reviews of this literature see Griliches, 1995, and Mairesse and 
                                                 
3 Notable exceptions are Blundell et al. (1999), Bloom and van Reenen (2002) and Toivanen et al. 
(2002). 
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Mohnen, 1996). As, however, returns to innovation rarely occur during the period in 
which the investment in innovation occurs, and in fact, may be spread over the 
number of years following such an investment, current profits or productivity effects 
are generally very partial and incomplete indicators of the returns to innovation (see 
the surveys by Hall, 2000, and Czarnitzki et al., 2006). For this reason, other scholars 
employed the so-called market value approach, which is based on a seminal 
contribution by Griliches (1981), to estimate returns to innovation. The market value 
framework employs the stock market value as an indicator of the sum of expected 
future profits of the firm which is then related to its book value and, in addition, to 
several measures of firms’ R&D activities. Typically scholars have measured the 
knowledge stock of firms by the (depreciated) sum of prior R&D investments and/or 
their patent stock (e.g. Bloom and van Reenen, 2002). 
 Although the market value method is intrinsically limited in scope, because it 
can be used only for public firms that are traded on a well-functioning financial 
market, using this method avoids timing problems of R&D costs and revenues, and is 
capable of forward-looking evaluation, something that studies analyzing profitability 
or productivity during a given period of time are not able to do.4 Furthermore, the 
market value method is useful for calibrating various innovation measures, in the 
sense that one can measure their economic impact and possibly enabling one to 
validate these measures for use elsewhere as proxies for innovation value. The latter 
argument motivates our study.  
 As stated above, most scholars used the R&D stock as measure for knowledge 
capital and supplemented it with patent stocks that may generate a premium as patent-
                                                 
4 See Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) for an alternative method of forward looking evaluation. They 
suggested relating measures of innovation to firms’ credit ratings, which are also forward-looking. 
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protected knowledge grants the owner a temporary monopoly and eases appropriation 
of the returns obtained from the initial R&D investment. While R&D stocks reflect 
firms’ inputs, or investments, in R&D, patent stocks measure the output, or “success”, 
of the R&D investments. The typical finding of prior market value studies is that both 
R&D and patent stock variables correlate positively with firms’ market value, and that 
patent stocks add information on the value of firms’ knowledge assets above and 
beyond R&D stocks (Hall, 2000, Czarnitzki et al., 2006).  
 While patent-based measures have the advantage that they are easily available 
from patent offices, cover long time series and a broad range of technologies (with 
software as partial exception in some patent systems, Hall et al., 2007), their 
usefulness as output indicator of R&D activities is seriously affected by the fact that 
patented inventions differ widely in their technological and economic value or 
“importance”. The value distribution of patents is highly skewed. A few patents are 
very valuable, but many are worth almost nothing (Pakes, 1985; Schankerman and 
Pakes, 1986; Harhoff et al., 1999; Deng, 2007). Thus, the estimation of an average 
effect of patent stocks may be misleading in valuing the knowledge assets of a firm. 
Hall et al. (2005) therefore suggest using forward patent citations as a patent value 
indicator in the market value equation. Forward citations are references to patents 
made by future patent applications. The more citations a firm’s patents receive, the 
more influential its patents are for future technology development, and the higher is 
the assumed economic value of a firm’s patent stock. While forward patent 
citations are found to correlate positively and significantly with patents’ economic 
value reported in surveys (Harhoff et al., 1999; Jaffe et al., 2000; Gambardella et al., 
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2008) as well as with firms’ market value (Hall et al., 2005),5 forward citations appear 
to explain only very little of the actual variance in patent value. Gambardella et al. 
(2008) show, based on patent value information from an inventor survey6, that 
forward citations only explain 1.4% of the variation in the economic value of 
European patents as reported by their inventors. Using patent renewal data to estimate 
the value of a set of patents filed at the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO), Bessen (2008) similarly finds that patent citations explain only a very small 
portion (less than 6%) of the variance in patent value.  
3 Estimating the Market Value of Blocking Patent Citations 
 Following Griliches (1981) a market value approach is applied to assess the 
private value of firms’ knowledge assets, including patents that receive blocking 
patent citations. The market value approach draws on the hedonic price model in 
viewing firms as bundles of assets and capabilities, from plants and equipment to 
intangible assets such as brand names, good will and knowledge. It is difficult to 
disentangle firms’ assets and capabilities since they are priced simultaneously on the 
market. The market value approach assumes that financial markets assign a valuation 
to the firm’s assets bundle that is equal to the present discounted value of their future 
cash flows. A number of recent empirical studies used the market value approach to 
estimate the economic value of knowledge assets of firms (Hall et al., 2000; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2006). 
                                                 
5 There is also evidence that forward patent citations correlate positively with patents’ social value 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). 
6 See Giuri et al. (2007) for a description of the PATVAL inventor survey and some first descriptive 
results. 
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 Following most existing studies we assume a market value equation, relying 
on the assumption that a firm’s assets enter additively. This leads to the following 
equation, with A representing the physical assets and K the knowledge assets of firm i 
at time t:  
  	 
             (1) 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale ( 	 ) equation (1) can be 
rewritten in logarithmic form as: 
   	 


	  
      

                 (2) 
The left hand side of the equation is the log of Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio 
of the market value to the replacement cost of the firm’s physical assets. The marginal 
or shadow value of the ratio of knowledge capital to physical assets is represented by 
γ. It captures the expectations of the investors over the effect of the knowledge capital 
relative to physical assets on the discounted future profits of the firm. Log q is the 
intercept of the model. 
 We use different variables to capture the knowledge assets K of a firm. First, 
we use the stock of firm’s R&D expenses. As R&D activities are highly uncertain 
activities, we use besides R&D expenses, also the stock of patent applications as a 
measure for successfully finished R&D activities. Since previous literature has shown 
that the distribution of patent value is highly skew (Pakes, 1985; Schankerman and 
Pakes, 1986; Harhoff et al., 1999; Deng, 2007; Gambardella et al., 2008) we use the 
stock of forward citations, i.e. citations patents receive by later filed patent 
applications, as a measure for the importance of patents, following Hall et al. (2005). 
As a last measure for the knowledge assets of firms we use a measure of the 
stock of blocking patent citations to test whether blocking citations correlate more 
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strongly with market value than other types of patent citations. Since blocking 
citations are measured by “X” and “Y” type of citations (see data section), the 
blocking citation stock variable is labelled as XYCIT in the specification below. The 
specification of the market value equation has a cascading structure in order to avoid 
identification issues due to potentially high correlations of different knowledge 
variables (see Hall et al., 2005). This results in the following specification: 
1 2 3 41
it it it it
it t it
it it it it
R&D PAT CIT XYCIT
lnQ ln q ln
A R&D PAT CIT
γ γ γ γ ε
 
= + + + + + + 
 
         (3) 
The coefficients in this cascading specification have to be interpreted as a premium or 
a discount on the former variable (Hall et al., 2005). For example, if the R&D stock 
over assets has a positive impact, a positive estimated coefficient of the patent stock 
over the R&D stock would reflect a premium of successfully finished R&D projects 
(as visible in patents) on top of the positive evaluation of the firms’ R&D input. 
Regarding our variable of main interest, the share of blocking citations, the estimated 
coefficient γ4 is expected to be positive, showing a value-premium for the share of 
citations that are “blocking” on top of the value of the total number of received patent 
citations. 
4 Data and Variables 
4.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of 151 publicly traded European7, U.S. and Japanese 
manufacturing companies who have their main economic activity in one of the 
following three industries: Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals (including Biotechnology), 
                                                 
7 European companies are located in Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K. 
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Electronics & IT Hardware, and Engineering and General Machinery. We have 
chosen these industries as the propensity to patent inventions is relatively large 
(Arundel and Kabla, 1998), making patents a good indicator of the output of R&D 
activities in these industries. The sample firms are the largest R&D spenders in their 
sector and country of origin according to the ‘2004 EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard’. The scoreboard lists the top 500 corporate investors in R&D whose 
headquarters are located in the EU, and the top 500 companies whose headquarters 
are located outside the EU (mainly the U.S. and Japan), based on corporate R&D 
investments. The sample consists of 63 pharmaceutical and chemicals firms, 60 in 
electronics and IT hardware and 28 firms active in engineering and general 
machinery. Regarding the distribution of firms across countries, 52 firms are U.S. 
based, 60 are Japanese and 39 firms are Europe based. 
 We collected financial, R&D and patent data at the corporate level for 
building a firm-level panel database (1995-2000). Market value, total assets and R&D 
expenditures (all expressed in $U.S.) are obtained from Datastream and Worldscope 
financial databases. Patent data is gathered from the OECD/EPO patent citation 
database (Webb et al., 2005). This database contains information on all patent 
applications filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), under the Patent Co-Operation Treaty (PCT), from 
the introduction of EPO in 1978 until September 2006 (2nd edition database). The 
patent database also provides for these patents a list of patent publications in other 
national or regional patent office’s pertaining to the same patent (equivalent patents). 
This information is used to calculate firm-level patent stocks on triadic patents. 
Further, patent equivalents are taken into consideration by the construction of the 
patent citation measures.  
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 To construct patent indicators at the consolidated level, we collected patents 
by the sample firms as well as their majority-owned subsidiaries. For this purpose, 
yearly lists of companies’ subsidiaries included in corporate annual reports, yearly 10-
K reports filed with the SEC in the U.S., and, for Japanese firms, information on 
foreign subsidiaries published by Toyo Keizai in the yearly ‘Directories of Japanese 
Overseas Investments’, are used. This consolidation exercise has been conducted 
annually to take into account changes in the group structure of firms, due to M&As, 
green-field investments and spin-offs. The patent stock of an acquired firm is 
considered to be part of the patent stock of an acquiring firm from the acquisition year 
onwards. The annual consolidation exercise constitutes a methodological 
improvement over existing market value studies where scholars consolidated data 
only in a single point in time. Due to missing data, our final sample is an unbalanced 
panel of 876 observations for 151 firms. 
4.2 Variables 
 Our dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of the firm 
to the replacement (book) value of its physical assets. Market value is defined as the 
sum of market capitalization (share price times the number of outstanding shares at 
the end of the year), preferred stock, minority interests, and total debt minus cash. The 
book value is the sum of net property, plant and equipment, current assets, long term 
receivables, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and other investments.  
 R&D stocks are calculated for each firm (and year) as a perpetual inventory of 
past and present annual R&D expenditures of the firm with a constant depreciation 
rate (δ) of 15 percent, as is common practice in the literature (see Griliches and 
Mairesse, 1984). We use the following formula for the R&D stock of a firm i in year 
t:  
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( ) 11it it itR&D stock R&D stock R&Dδ −= − + .                                           (4) 
The initial value of the R&D stock is calculated, for each firm, at the first year of 
available R&D data as:  
( )0 0i iR & D stock R & D / gδ= + .                                                       (5) 
An annual growth rate (g) of 8.7 percent is used.8 Annual R&D expenditures and the 
firms’ total assets are deflated using GDP deflators. 
 Patent stocks are constructed using the same formula as for R&D stocks and 
the same depreciation rate (δ) of 15 percent. They are based on the complete listing of 
firms’ triadic patents. Triadic patents are patents that are simultaneously filed at the 
European Patent Office (EPO), the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO), and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO). Triadic patents are collected from 
the OECD/EPO patent citation database (Webb et al., 2005) by identifying, for each 
firm and consolidation year, all EPO patent applications since 1978, the foundation 
year of the EPO, and only keeping those patents that are also filed (i.e. have 
equivalent patents) at the USPTO and the JPO. Since we have complete annual 
listings of the triadic patents of the sample firms, starting in 1978, no initial values for 
the patent (and citation) stock variables are calculated. Patent stocks are computed 
based on triadic patents in order to have comparable indicators for firms from 
different home countries (Europe, Japan and US). Patenting may namely be 
characterized by a home bias as firms may be more likely to apply for patents at the 
patent office of their home country rather than at other patent offices (Dernis and 
Khan, 2004).  
                                                 
8 This is the average R&D growth rate in our sample. Similar results are obtained when we use a 
growth rate of 8 percent, which is used in other market value studies (e.g. Hall and Oriani, 2006; Hall 
et al., 2007).  
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 Patent citation stocks are constructed based on the citations received by the 
firms’ patents during a fixed time window of five years after the patent’s priority date, 
following earlier work (e.g. Hall et al., 2007), using the same formula as for R&D and 
patent stocks. Citations are restricted to citing patents with a search report prepared by 
EPO examiners (direct EPO filings and PCT filings at EPO) because these reports 
allow distinguishing between different types of citations to prior art. Patent 
equivalents of these filings at national patent offices are taken into account in the 
calculation of the citation counts. If patent equivalents would be ignored, the number 
of forward citations that a patent receives would be underestimated (see Harhoff et al., 
2005; Webb et al., 2005). Other than at the USPTO the patent applicant at the EPO is 
not subject to the “duty of candor” and does not have to report relevant prior art in the 
patent application. In consequence, about 90% of all patent citations in EPO patents 
are added by the patent examiner (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008). The search for 
prior art taken out by the patent examiner follows The Guidelines for Examination in 
the European Patent Office9, which define a certain quality standard for patent 
examination and ensure equal treatment of all EPO patent applications. The 
examination guidelines explicitly require examiners to be objective and selective 
when defining the documents referred to as prior art. For most of the cases one to two 
documents are sufficient to determine the scope of the patent application in question 
(Michel and Bettels, 2001). This parsimonious and objective approach ensures that 
the references are a relevant subsample of the actual state of the art rather than an 
overview on the subject-matter of the invention (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004, Harhoff 
                                                 
9 See http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/guidelines.html. 
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et al., 2005). The result of the patent examiners’ search for prior art is summarized in 
the so-called patent search report.  
The Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office require that the 
references to prior art are classified according to their relevance for the patent 
application in question. While prior art can be cited as documents defining the non-
infringing state of the art in a technology field, two types of citations restrict the 
patentability of the patent application, namely citation types X and Y. X-type citations 
are documents showing essential features of the invention under investigation or at 
least questioning the inventive step of these features if taken alone. Y-type citations 
question the inventive steps claimed in the invention being examined, when combined 
with one or more documents (Harhoff et al., 2005; Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008).10 
We label X and Y-type citations as blocking citations in line with prior research (e.g. 
Guellec et al., 2008). Prior research has shown that patents which receive backward 
blocking citations have a lower probability to get granted (Guellec et al., 2008) and a 
higher probability to face opposition after granting since they are “weak” patents 
(Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; Czarnitzki et al., 2009). Note that a patent application can 
still be granted if it receives backward blocking citations (although this is less likely). 
This can, for instance, be the case for patent applications with many claims. Blocking 
citations may only pertain to single claims and the remaining claims can be strong 
enough to get a modified patent application granted.   
In this study, we use the number of forward blocking citations that firms’ 
patents receive as indicator of the extent to which these patents may hinder the 
                                                 
10 The Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office present two examples for references 
to be marked with a “Y” (see Chapter X, paragraph 9.1.2). First, the combination of patents and 
scientific documents which typically cover rather basic technological advances that need to be 
combined with applied technologies to be novelty challenging (Della Malva and Hussinger, 2010) are 
Y-type citations. Second, patent families that threaten the novelty of patent applications are cited as Ys. 
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granting of other firms’ patents (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008). These patents can 
hinder technology competition and are expected to contribute more to the market 
value of the firms by which they are owned than patents with receive non-blocking 
forward patent citations. The X and Y forward citations are used to build the blocking 
citation stock variable, which is based on equation (4), using a depreciation rate (δ) of 
15 percent. In addition, we use two industry dummies, ten country dummies and five 
year dummies in all the market value specifications. As a robustness check we control 
for firm-level fixed effects.  
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample. The sample firms are large 
and R&D intensive with total assets, R&D stocks, and triadic patent stocks equal to 
respectively $U.S. 9,771 million, $U.S. 603 million and 303 triadic patents, on 
average. The Tobin’s Q values have a mean value of 2.02, well above unity. Firms’ 
patents receive, on average, more than 1 citation (1.47), reflecting the, on average, 
high economic value of triadic patents. About 42% of the patent citations received by 
the sample firms’ patents can be labelled as “blocking”, as measured by their 
classification as X or Y references. 
Insert table 1 about here 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients. The cascading specification of the 
variables keeps the correlations between the regressors at a reasonable level.  
Insert table 2 about here 
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5 Market Value Estimations 
 Table 3 reports the results for the estimation of the market value equation. We 
estimate equation (3) by nonlinear least squares. We start with a model that includes 
R&D over assets only and then sequentially add patents, citations and blocking 
citations. Year, country and industry dummies are included in all specifications. The 
results are largely in line with Hall et al. (2005). The R&D, patent and citation 
variables are positively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q (Models I, II and III). In 
our augmented model IV, our variable of main interest, the blocking citation ratio, is 
added. The estimated coefficient for this variable shows a positive sign and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, all else constant. This result shows that the 
market value of firms is higher when firms’ patents receive forward citations that are 
“blocking” in nature. 
To get an indication of the economic magnitude of the estimated effects, we 
calculated semi-elasticities of Tobin’s Q with regard to each of the main variables. 
Table 3 reports average values of the semi-elasticities and standard errors across all 
sample observations. Three major observations are apparent. First, as we move from 
Model I to Model IV, the semi-elasticities of R&D, patent and citation variables 
decrease as further variables are added. Second, the semi-elasticities for the patent and 
citation variables are significantly higher for our sample than those reported in other 
studies (e.g. Hall et al., 2005, for a sample of U.S. firms, or Hall et al., 2007, for a 
sample of European firms). This may be explained by the fact that we use stocks of 
triadic patents and focus on the largest R&D actors in the world in our sample. Third, 
the largest effect for a unit change of a regressor is found for the blocking citations 
(ratio) variable. A unit change, i.e. a change in the blocking citation ratio from 0 to 1, 
increases the market value by 89 percent. A more realistic change in the blocking 
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citation ratio of one standard deviation (=11 percent points) yields a higher market 
value of about 10 percent.  
Insert table 3 about here 
To control for unobserved firm-specific effects, we re-estimate the models 
using a panel data estimator which employs pre-sample information for the dependent 
variable (Czarnitzki and Dhaene, 2011). The estimator is based on a count data fixed 
effect estimation approach proposed by Blundell et al. (1995). It has the advantage 
that it does not rely on the assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors. 
Czarnitzki and Dhaene (2011) show that the pre-sample fixed effects approach is 
consistent and efficient for both linear and non-linear least squares regressions.11 
Technically, this estimator models fixed effects as the average value of the dependent 
variable in the pre-sample period, which is included in the model as an additional 
regressor.  
Table 4 reports the regression results and average semi-elasticities of the 
models including firm-level fixed effects. It is apparent that a large part of the firms’ 
market value is explained by unobserved firm-specific effects. The estimated 
coefficients and semi-elasticities are much smaller if firm-specific effects are taken 
into account. Nevertheless, the results are largely in line with the pooled cross-
sectional estimations. Again, the blocking citation ratio shows a strong positive 
impact on market value with a semi-elasticity of 110 percent, on average. The most 
remarkable difference compared to Table 3 is that the R&D stock over assets turns 
insignificant for most model specifications once fixed effects are taken into account. 
                                                 
11 Czarnitzki and Dhaene (2011) have applied this method to the data used in Hall et al. (2005) and 
have shown that their original regression results hold if pre-sample fixed effects are taken into account. 
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This may be explained by the fact that R&D changes only slowly over time and is 
therefore highly correlated with the firm specific fixed effect (Hall et al., 2005).  
Insert table 4 about here 
As an additional robustness check we repeated the pooled cross-sectional and 
fixed effect regressions of Models III and IV, but excluded self-citations from the two 
citation-based variables. Self-citations are defined as citations to patents that are 
owned by the same parent firm, or one of its consolidated subsidiaries, as the cited 
patent. On average, 28 percent of the patent citations received by the firms are self-
citations (see Table1). It is important that our results hold in this setting since the 
rationale for the high economic value of patents with blocking citations is that these 
patents have to potential to hinder the granting of patents on related technologies of 
other firms. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 5, and confirm the 
earlier finding that the blocking citation ratio has a strong positive impact on the 
market value of firms. The estimated effect of the blocking citation ratio variables in 
Table 5 is higher than in the comparable models that include self-citations (cf. Tables 
3 and 4), supporting our rationale that patents with blocking forward citations derive 
their value by blocking “other firms”.  
Insert table 5 about here 
6 Conclusions 
Innovation is considered to be a major cause of economic growth and welfare. 
A necessary condition for private innovative activity to take place is that innovation 
increases the profits of those performing R&D activities. This has stimulated 
researchers to assess the value of firms’ R&D activities, patents, patent citations as a 
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patent value correlate (e.g. Hall et al., 2005) and innovation strategies (e.g. 
Ceccagnoli, 2009). This paper contributes to this stream of the literature.  
We add to this literature in that we investigate differences in the value of 
patented inventions as visible in the purpose for which they are cited by later patent 
applications. Making use of the citation classification available at the EPO, patents 
cited in later patent applications because they challenge their novelty or inventive step 
(blocking citations) are distinguished from patents cited as non-infringing state of the 
art in a technology field. The research hypothesis of the paper is that patents that 
frequently appear as blocking references in future patent filings (of other firms) are 
more valuable to their owners than patented inventions which receive mainly non-
blocking citations. Blocking citations indicate that the cited patent threatens the 
granting of other patents, which may provide the owner of the cited patent with an 
important competitive advantage as the cited patent may keep competitors off markets 
and technologies, by legally depriving competitors from obtaining patents on related 
inventions or by narrowing the scope of their patents. Blocking references can refer to 
single patent claims so that a patent application can still be granted if the respective 
claim is removed or modified.  
The research hypothesis is examined by introducing a measure for “blocking 
citations” to the market value equation that is used by Hall et al. (2005). Market value 
estimations are performed on a panel dataset (1995-2000) of 151 publicly traded 
European, U.S. and Japanese R&D intensive firms from three manufacturing 
industries. Firm-level patent variables are calculated based on annually consolidated 
patent data, and we include firm-level fixed effects in the analyses. The identification 
of “blocking” patent citations is done by using a feature of the European patent 
system, the search report, where patents are classified according to their relevance for 
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the patent application in question. Citations that are classified as “X” or “Y” 
references are labeled as blocking citations.  
Our findings show that the market value of firms is larger when they possess a 
patent stock which receives more “blocking” patent citations. The estimated effect of 
the blocking citation ratio on the market value of firms is very large, with an average 
semi-elasticity above 100 percent. This result adds to the literature on the 
measurement of the economic value of patents (e.g. Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall et al., 
2005; Gittelman, 2008) by showing that there are differences in the informational 
value of patent citations on the economic value of patents depending on the citation 
type. The observation that a substantial part of the value assigned to forward citations 
stems from one category of patent citations (“blocking citations”), suggests that total 
forward citations may be an imprecise measure of the economic value of patents.  
 In this paper, we used firm-level data and the market value approach to 
investigate the value of patents receiving blocking citations. An interesting track for 
future research concerns the validation of our results in an analysis on data at the level 
of individual patents. Data on the economic value of individual patents could be 
collected from surveys of patent inventors (such as the PATVAL surveys for EPO 
patents), or by undertaking surveys of patent applicants (firms and universities) on the 
value of their patent portfolios. Another suggestion for future research is to examine 
whether there are differences across technologies and industries in the importance of 
blocking patent citations. It may be that blocking citations are more important for 
patents in discrete than in complex technologies. In discrete technologies, individual 
patents may have the potential to create monopolies in a technology space allowing 
firms to extract rents, while in complex technologies, the ability to extract rents may 
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come less from monopolies of individual patents, but rather from the size of firms’ 
patent portfolios.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (876 obs.) 
 mean std. dev. 
Tobin's Q 2.03 2.14 
assets 9770.99 13541.76 
R&D stock 603.29 947.89 
R&D stock/ assets 0.30 0.20 
triadic patent stock 302.83 584.20 
triadic patent stock/ R&D stock 0.13 0.13 
triadic citation stock 447.11 833.37 
triadic citation stock/triadic patent stock 1.47 0.57 
triadic XY citation stock 181.35 331.64 
triadic XY citation stock/triadic citation stock 0.42 0.11 
triadic self-citation stock 133.70 284.95 
triadic citation stock excl. self-citations 313.41 579.05 
triadic XY citation stock excl. self-citations 131.34 237.21 
triadic XY citation stock excl. self-citations/ 
triadic citation stock excl. self-citations 0.42 0.11 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix (876 obs.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 log of Tobin’s Q 
2 R&D/assets 0.37 *** 
3 patents/R&D -0.02 -0.20 *** 
4 citations/patents 0.38 *** 0.41 *** -0.08 ** 
5 XY citations/citations 0.35 *** 0.38 *** -0.09 *** 0.47 *** 
6 citations/patentsA 0.30 *** 0.40 *** -0.23 *** 0.88 *** 0.45 *** 
7 XYcitations/citationsA 0.37 *** 0.40 *** -0.04 0.47 *** 0.94 *** 0.44 *** 
A Variables are calculated without self-citations. Note that these variables are used in the 
estimations as alternatives to the citation variables that include self-citations. 
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Table 3: Market value estimates  
 I II III IV 
 dependent variable: log of Tobin’s Q 
 coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
 (s.e.)A (s.e.)A (s.e.)A (s.e.)A 
constant 0.60*** 0.49*** 0.04 -0.33 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.17) (0.26) 
R&D/assets 0.70*** 0.90*** 0.72** 0.72 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.35) (0.51) 
patents/ R&D 0.72*** 0.95*** 1.20** 
  (0.21) (0.32) (0.50) 
citations/ patents  0.44*** 0.37* 
   (0.16) (0.22) 
XY citations/ citations  2.55** 
    (1.01) 
N 876 876 876 876 
adjusted R2 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.44 
   Semi-elasticities  
 semi-elasticity semi-elasticity semi-elasticity semi-elasticity 
 (s.e.)B (s.e.)B (s.e.)B (s.e.)B 
R&D/assets 0.58*** 0.67*** 0.37** 0.25 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
patents/ R&D  0.54*** 0.49*** 0.42*** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
citations/ patents   0.23*** 0.13** 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
XY citations/ citations    0.89*** 
    (0.20) 
A Robust standard errors  
B Standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
The regressions contain 10 country dummies, 2 industry dummies and 5 year dummies. 
*,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1percent significance levels. 
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Table 4: Market value estimates controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
 I II III IV 
 dependent variable: log of Tobin’s Q 
 coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
 (s.e.)A (s.e.)A (s.e.)A (s.e.)A 
constant 0.33*** 0.27*** -0.02 -0.43*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) 
R&D/assets 0.20 0.27* 0.10 -0.21 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.20) (0.29) 
patents/ R&D 0.41*** 0.47** 0.59** 
  (0.15) (0.18) (0.27) 
citations/ patents  0.25** 0.15 
   (0.10) (0.13) 
XY citations/ citations  2.41*** 
    (0.59) 
pre-sample mean (log Tobin’s Q)  0.62*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 876 876 876 876 
adjusted R2 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.56 
 Semi-elasticities 
 semi-elasticity semi-elasticity semi-elasticity semi-elasticity 
 (s.e.)B (s.e.)B (s.e.)B (s.e.)B 
R&D/assets 0.19 0.24* 0.07 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
patents/ R&D  0.36*** 0.33*** 0.27** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
citations/ patents   0.17*** 0.07 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
XY citations/ citations    1.10*** 
    (0.18) 
A Robust standard errors  
B Standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
The regressions contain 10 country dummies, 2 industry dummies and 5 year dummies. 
*,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1percent significance levels. 
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Table 5: Market value estimates excluding self-citations 
 I II III IV 
 dependent variable: log of Tobin’s Q 
 coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
 (s.e.)A (s.e.)A (s.e.)A (s.e.)A 
constant 0.25* -0.16 0.16 -0.27** 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.11) (0.14) 
R&D/assets 0.90*** 0.83* 0.23 -0.10 
 (0.32) (0.46) (0.18) (0.26) 
patents/ R&D 1.01*** 0.98** 0.50*** 0.40* 
 (0.30) (0.42) (0.17) (0.23) 
citations/ patents 0.27* 0.08 0.11 -0.05 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.09) (0.12) 
XY citations/ citations 2.72***  2.38*** 
  (0.79)  (0.45) 
pre-sample mean (log Tobin’s Q)   0.60*** 0.61*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
N 876 876 876 876 
adjusted R2 0.41 0.43 0.53 0.56 
 Semi-elasticities 
 semi-elasticity semi-elasticity semi-elasticity semi-elasticity 
 (s.e.)B (s.e.)B (s.e.)B (s.e.)B 
R&D/assets 0.55*** 0.33** 0.19 -0.05 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) 
patents/ R&D 0.61*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.21* 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) 
citations/ patents 0.16** 0.03 0.09 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
XY citations/ citations  1.07***  1.23*** 
  (0.18)  (0.16) 
A Robust standard errors  
B Standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
The regressions contain 10 country dummies, 2 industry dummies and 5 year dummies. 
*,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1percent significance levels. 
 
